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OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; COMUSJAPAN FOR
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA
SUBJECT: AEGIS UPDATE: JAPANESE DEFENSE MINISTER AND VICE
ADMIRAL REGRET NEW LEAK CASE

REF: TOKYO 3028

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)
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SUMMARY

¶1. (S) In a July 19 update for the Ambassador on the Aegis
leak investigations, Vice Chief of Staff of the MSDF Vice
Admiral Kato stated that Kanagawa Prefecture Police and the
MSDF planned to indict the MSDF seaman who had copied AEGIS
information onto his personal computer by mid-August before
the five-year statute of limitations expires. He also raised
a separate case involving an MSDF officer who had
photographed classified U.S. military documents while
participating in an exercise on board a U.S. naval vessel in
Hawaii. MOD was currently investigating whether the photos
had been obtained by third parties. Kato, and subsequently
Defense Minister Koike, expressed deep regret over the
incident and voiced concern whether this new case would
negatively affect bilateral information sharing even more
than the AEGIS case. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S) On July 19, Vice Chief of Staff of the Japanese MSDF
Vice Admiral Tamotsu Kato called on Ambassador Schieffer to
provide an update on the Ministry of Defense's (MOD)
investigations into the AEGIS leak and details of a separate
incident involving the mishandling of U.S. classified
information by a member of the MSDF.

CLEARER PICTURE OF AEGIS DATA MOVEMENT

¶3. (S) Kato stated that investigations into the AEGIS leak
had progressed to the point where MOD could trace the
movement of the AEGIS data from the Program Generating Center
(PGC), where the data was compiled for training purposes, to
the Gunnery Division of the First Maritime Service School
(FMSS). The PGC, renamed from the Service System Center
(SSC) in 2002, created the data the same year. Four staff
members of the PGC compiled the information and created seven
files of AEGIS training material. LCDR Matsuuchi, who was
stationed at the PGC, and LCDR Kanda from the FMSS
participated in AEGIS system training in the United States in
the summer of 2002, shortly after completing the PGC's AEGIS
overview course. After returning from the United States,
Kanda -- now assigned as course instructor for a new AEGIS
overview course at the FMSS -- obtained from Matsuuchi the
PGC's AEGIS files due to the lack of adequate teaching
materials. LT Miyawaki, who was an instructor at the FMSS,
subsequently copied Kanda's files to distribute to students
as reference material.

POLICE, MOD TO INDICT SUSPECT BY MID-AUGUST

¶4. (S) Kato assured the Ambassador that the level of
cooperation between the NCIS and MOD's Damage Assessment
Group was excellent. They were checking all personal and
workplace computers used by all people who had worked at the
PGC, the FMSS, and the SSC to make sure that the AEGIS data
had not spread any further. He added that Kanagawa
Prefecture Police and the MSDF planned to conclude
investigations by mid-August in order to indict the suspect

before the five-year statute of limitations expires.

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NEW INCIDENT: PHOTOS OF U.S. CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
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¶5. (S) Kato also informed the Ambassador that MOD was
currently investigating a separate incident involving LCDR
Matsumoto -- an MSDF officer who, in 1999, had photographed
classified documents with his digital camera while
participating in an exercise on board the USS Port Royal in
Hawaii. Matsumoto, who had previously worked at the PGC and
was tasked with compiling information to be used in designing
MSDF weapons systems, had followed standard bilateral
procedures for borrowing documents on U.S. weapons systems
from the crew for note-taking, but had deviated from standard
practice by taking photographs. Kato, observing that this
was highly unusual behavior, said that Matsumoto had told
MSDF investigators that he could not take sufficient notes in
the time permitted for note-taking and that photographing was
easier. The four documents photographed by Matsumoto
comprised files on the CG-65 (AEGIS-related), SM-2 missiles,
Lamps Mark III helicopters, Mark-45 gun system, and Tomahawk
Land Attack Cruise Missile system. All of the documents were
classified CONFIDENTIAL and involved systems already in the
JMSDF inventory, except for the Tomahawk system.

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MOD TO TAKE ADDED MEASURES; DEFMIN, KATO APOLOGIZE
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¶6. (S) Kato said MOD was currently investigating whether the
photos had been obtained by third parties. He promised the
Ambassador a briefing after MOD finalizes its plans for new
preventive measures against classified information leaks.
Kato, noting that MOD was reviewing possible disciplinary
actions against the officer, expressed regret over the
incident and voiced concern that this case could have more
serious repercussions on bilateral information sharing than
the AEGIS case. (Note: In a subsequent call on the
Ambassador, Defense Minister Koike personally apologized for
the incident and assured the Ambassador that Matsumoto would
be discharged from the MSDF.)

¶7. (S) Comment: It is noteworthy, and welcome, that MOD
Administrative Vice Minister Moriya had tasked Kato to brief
Ambassador Schieffer immediately after Kato briefed him on
the discovery of another information assurance problem. So
far, there has been no mention of this problem in the press.
SCHIEFFER